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THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE IN
CRIMINAL CASES.*
In the case of Coffin v. United States,' decided in March,
1895, the Supreme Court of the United States had an opportu-
nity to clear up the confusion and ambiguity that hang over
the common talk about the presumption of innocence in crimi-
nal cases. The opportunity was sadly misimproved. It is quite
time that the opinion in this case should be subjected to a criti-
cal examination. This is all the more desirable because the
tendency of it is to encourage that feeble administration of
our criminal law which is doing so much in these days to
render it ineffectual.
It will be desirable, in order fully to understand the matter,
to enter upon some preliminary explanations. England, our
mother country, had formerly an extremely harsh body of crimi-
nal law. Fitzjames Stephen, forty years ago, declared that
"the English judges of the eighteenth century administered
what, without any exception, was the most cruelly severe penal
code that ever existed." 2 Blackstone tells us that, in his time
there were one hundred and sixty capital offences without bene-
fit of clergy, for "actions which men are daily liable to com-
mit! "3
In Henry the Eighth's reign of thirty-eight years it is said
that eighty thousand persons were executed in England as com-
mon malefactors. In ten years of James the First's reign,
from z6o9 to x618, inclusive, nearly fifteen hundred persons
were hanged in the city of London, and in the County of Mid-
dlesex alone, including the considerable number (thirty-two in
Middlesex) who died by thepine forte et dure.4 In the sixteenth
century, in treason and felony, no witness was allowed for
accused persons; in the seventeenth century the witnesses that
were received for them were not allowed to be sworn: and no
counsel was permitted to help them in trying their case on the
This paper contains the substance of one of the Storrs Lectures of 1896.
I56 U. S. 432.
2 Jurid. Soc. Papers, i. 468.
3 Com., IV. x8.
'Jeaffreson's Middlesex County Records, Vol. 2, xvi-xxi.
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facts, until in the eighteenth century, "by the connivance of the
court," and, finally, by statute, in 1834. .The judges were
removable by the Crown until the .English Revolution, and not-
withstanding the maxim that they were to act as counsel for the
accused, they were greatly in the habit of considering everything
favorably to the Crown. Torture was practiced in some cases.
It may be remarked, in passing, that torture was recognized
even in New England in the seventeenth century. In the colo-
nial laws of Massachusetts we read: "No man shall be forced
by torture to confess any crime against himself or any other,
unless it be in some capital case, where he is first fully con-
victed by clear and sufficient evidence to be guilty; after which
if the case be of that nature that it is very apparent there be
other conspirators or confederates with him, then he may be
tortured, yet not with such tortures as are barbarous or in-
humane.' '6
But all this cruelty was accompanied and relieved by humane
maxims, rules of procedure, and practical adjustments of one
sort and another, which tended to make it endurable.' There
was the jury system, which protected accused persons through
the sympathies of their fellow-citizens. There was the common
law system of evidence which saved them, in an increasing
degree, from being tried on prejudice. There was the maxim,
running back into the earliest Year Books, that no person should
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. And there was the
principle that it were better that a guilty person should be un-
5 Laws of i66o (Whitmore's Edition), 187; Anc. Charters and Laws of
Mass., i8o. The year of this enactment is not given. What is called "The
Laws of i66o," is a compilation of that year.
6 It may be added that our administration of the criminal law to-day, in a
period when the substantive law is merciful, is sadly enfeebled by a continuance
of some rules and practices which should have disappeared with the cruel laws
that they were designed to mitigate. I may refer to the refusal of new trials
to the government in some classes of cases, to the absurd extreme to which
the rule about confessions in evidence is sometimes pressed, to the strained
interpretation of the prohibition of ex post facto laws, to the continuation of
technicalities of criminal procedure and practice which have lost their reason
for existence and to a superstitious rigor in enforcing these, which still shows
itself. In following English precedents in such matters, we forget to sup-
plement them by that saving good sense which appears in the swiftness and
vigor of the English administration of criminal law. If we follow English
practices we -should remember that they are all meant to go together. Excel-
lent criticisms of this sort may be found in the dissenting opinion of Peckham,
J., speaking for himself and Justices Brewer and White, in Crain v. U. S.,
162 U. S. 625, 646, 65o. He justly characterizes the result arrived at in the
opinion of the court as - most deplorable."
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punished than that an innocent one should be condemned-a
doctrine laid down in the Digest,' where it is attributed to the
Emperor Trajan.
That maxim, by the way, has had a singular history. First
found in the Digest, it appears in the Year Books of Edward the
First, twelve centuries later, in substantially the same form
above quoted.' In the fifteenth century we find Fortescue say-
ing: "Truly I would rather that twenty guilty men should
escape through pity than that one just man should be unjustly
condemned.' Two centuries later we have Sir Matthew Hale
saying that "It is better that five guilty persons should escape
unpunished than that one innocent person should die."" A lit-
tle later we find one of the victims of Titus Oates's perjury say-
ing to the judges with pardonable exaggeration that, "It is bet-
ter a thousand guilty men should escape than one innocent man
should die."" A century later Blackstone tells us that, "It is
better that ten guilty persons should escape than that one inno-
cent person should suffer."' Early in the present century, in a
series of Irish cases, we find it repeatedly said that "It is better
that ninety-nine guilty persons should escape than that one inno-
cent man should be punished."" Finally, in an article upon the
trial of Dr. Webster, in 1851,'" Professor Joel Parker, formerly
Chief-Justice of New Hampshire, is found, as Paley before
him, and Fitzjames Stephen since, stoutly controverting the
statement of Blackstone, that ten guilty persons should escape
rather than one innocent person suffer; but prepared to admit
that it is better that one should escape than that an innocent
person should suffer. And thus we may return to the mod-
eration of the early proposition in the corp5us juris. Obviously
these phrases are not to be taken literally. They all mean the
same thing, differing simply in emphasis-namely, that it is
better to run risks in the way of letting the guilty go, than of
convicting the innocent.
Another of those practical adjustments favorable to the
accused person which enabled our English ancestors to endure
the horrors of their substantive criminal law, was the doctrine of
7 48, 19, 5.
8 Y. B. 3o and 31 Edw. I., 538.
9 De Laud. c. 27.
to P. C. 11., 289.'
" Lord Stafford's Case, 7 How. St. Tr. 1529 (i6go).
12Com. IV., 358.
13E. g., in Killen and McCann's Case, 28 St. Tr. r013 (1803).
4 72 N. A. Rev. 200-202.
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benefit of clergy; originally the benefit in certain capital eases,
if the accused were an ecclesiastic, of being turned over to the
spiritual arm, and not hanged, for the ecclesiastics never hanged.
The test of an ecclesiastic was that he could read, and so
the Bishop sent in a representative to try the accused with
his "neck verse." As Smith in the sixteenth century, in his
"Commonwealth of England," tells us: "In many felonies, as
in theft of oxen, sheep, money or other such things, which be
no open robberies by the highway side, nor assaulting one by
night in his house, putting him that is there in fear, such is the
favor of our law, that for the first fault the felon shall be admit-
ted to his clergy, for which purpose the Bishop must send one
with authority under his seal to be judge in that matter at every
jail delivery. If the condemned man demandeth to be admitted
to his book, the judge commonly giveth him a psalter, and
turneth to what place he will. The prisoner readeth so well as
he can (God knoweth, sometimes very slenderly): then he [the
judge] asketh of the Bishop's commissary, legit ut clericus? The
commissary may say legit, or non legit; for these be words formal,
and our men of law be very precise in their words formal. If he
say legit, the judge proceedeth no further to sentence of death;
if he say non, the judge forthwith, or the next day, proceedeth to
sentence." 1 This came to be the general test in what continued
to be called the benefit of clergy-the power to read, and these
imaginary ecclesiastics, were discharged with little or no pun-
ishment. One who had claimed this privilege, and had it, was
branded on the brawn of his thumb, so that if he appeared
again he might be known; for he could have it only once.
We also had benefit of clergy, on this side of the water. It
was allowed in the case of the soldiers who were convicted of
manslaughter at the Boston Massacre. Benefit of clergy, in
England, was abolished in 1827. For centuries it mitigated,
substantially, the severity of the English criminal law.
Always, of course, there was operating in favor of the
accused the sound maxim of general jurisprudence that the
plaintiff or, rather, the party" who seeks to move the court, must
make out a reason for his request. This rule is sometimes ex-
pressed in the form of a presumption, pres7unitur pro neganti; or,
having regard to the Latin terms for plaintiff and defendant,
actor and reus,-,presumiturpro reo. That is a maxim of policy and
practical sense; it is not founded on any notion that defendants
generally are free from blame. It is a maxim or principle that
is Smith's Com., Eng. Bk. II. C. 27. This book was written in 1565.
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saves the defendant by the mere inertia of the court, if the
plaintiff does not make out his case. This maxim, in this bare
form, and without the familiar additional clause as to the greater
force of persuasion in criminal cases, always operated for the
accused. It is probably true that in the form last given it has
sometimes been mistranslated, and given a special application to
criminal cases, as if reus necessarily meant a person charged with
crime, and not merely, as it truly does, a defendant in any sort
of a case. The operation and exact scope of this maxim, both
in civil and criminal 'ases, was very neatly expressed by the
General Court (the Legislature) of Massachusetts so long ago as
x657, as follows: "Whereas, in all civil cases depending in suit,
the plaintiff affirmeth that the defendant hath done him wrong
and accordingly presents his case for judgment and satisfaction
-it behoveth the court and jury to see that the affirmation be
proved by sufficient evidence, else the case must be found for
the defendant; and so it is also in a criminal case, for, in the
eye of the law every man is honest and innocent, unless it be
proved legally to the contrary."'6
In this country and in recent times, much emphasis in crimi-
nal cases has been put on the presumption of innocence. Al ways
and everywhere great emphasis was placed on the rule that in
criminal cases there can be no conviction unless guilt is estab-
lished with very great clearness-as we say nowadays, beyond
reasonable doubt. In civil cases it is enough if the mere bal-
ance of probability is with the plaintiff, but in criminal cases
there must be a clear, heavy, emphatic preponderance.
Now, what does the presumption of innocence mean? Does
it mean anything more than a particular application of that gen-
eral rule of sense and convenience, running through all the law,
that men in general are taken, primafade-i. e., in the absence
of evidence to the contrary, to be good, honest, free from
blame, presumed to do their duty in every situation in life; so
that no one need go forward, whether in pleading or proof, to
show as regards himself or another, that the fact is so, but every
one shall have it presumed in his favor? If it does, what is its
meaning?
Let us trace the use of this maxim. In recent years, in this
country, at the hands of heated counsel and of some judges, it
has been given an extraordinary stretch. One may read, for
instance, in a late American book on Evidence, the following
statement: "The presumption of innocence is not a mere
16Records of Massachusetts, III., 434-435.
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phrase without meaning; it is in the nature of evidence for the
defendant; it is as irresistible as the heavens till overcome; it
hovers over the prisoner as a guardian angel throughout the
trial; it goes with every part and parcel of the evidence.',
That "purple patch" is not marked as being quoted from any-
body; but in reality, I believe, it was an impassioned utterance of
Rufus Choate, one of the most eloquent and successful advo-
cates of his time." Such a passage as that, gravely woven into
the text of a legal treatise may show the extent to which the
presumption of innocence has been overdone in our hysterical
American fashion of defending accused persons. But let us
observe it in its earlier history. In Bracton, say in i26o, we
find it in the most general form-de quolibet homine resurnitur quod
sit bonus homo donecirobetur in contrarium." In a great and famous
continental work on Presumptions by Menochius,0 three centu-
ries later, we have the simple phrase: "Illa presunvptio qua
dicirnus quenilibetpresumi innocentern," and that is all the emphasis
he gives it. In the middle of the next century, the General
Court of Massachusetts, in a passage partly quoted before, said,
simply and precisely, "It behoveth both court and jury to see
that the affirmation be proved by sufficient evidence, else the
case must be found for the defendant, and so also it is in a crimi-
nal case; for in the eyes of the law every man is honest and
innocent unless it be proved legally to the contrary. In crimi-
nal prosecutions the presumption is in favor of the defendant,.
for thus far it is to be hoped of all mankind, that they are not
guilty in any such instances, and the penalty enhances the pre-
sumption. "21
Very little is said about it before this century, and these
quotations fairly illustrate the slight emphasis given it, and the
part it plays. In looking through the arguments of Erskine and
Curran and other great lawyers famous for their defence of
accused persons, and through the charges of the court given to
juries-in the last century and the early part of this, we shall find
very little, indeed almost nothing, about the presumption of
innocence. But a great deal will be found, a very great empha-
sis is placed, upon the rule that a party must be proved guilty by
a very great weight of evidence. That is the important thing.
17 Bradner, Evidence, 460.
is Lawson, Pres. Ev. 433 n.
19 Bracton, 193.
21955, col. i, r6.21 Ubi sublra.
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And I think it will be found that, in English practice, down to
our time, the presumption of innocence-except as a synonym
for the general principle incorporated in that total phrase which
expresses the rule about a reasonable doubt, namely, that the
accused must be proved guilty, and that beyond a reasonable
doubt-plays a very small part indeed.
Take, for example, two famous English cases of this century.
In Despard's case21 the Attorney-General in his opening argu-
ment said: "I am, however, gentlemen, ready to admit what no
doubt the counsel for the prisoner would be glad to have
brought forward to your attention, that the great depravity
which is required to conceive and to execute a crime of such ex-
tensive mischief, so far from operating to create any prejudice
against the prisoner, ought rather to give him a fairer claim to
the utmost benefit of that indulgent and salutary principle of
our law, which holds every man to be innocent till he is proved
to be guilty; and, therefore, he will unquestionably be entitled
to that which I am sure he will experience at your hands, that
the charge should be well watched, that the evidence should bt
well sifted, and that your minds should be most satisfactorily
convinced of his guilt, before you think of pronouncing a verdict
against him." Serjedaut Best (afterwards Chief-justice Best),
for the defence (col. 437) said: "Gentlemen, having made
these observations, I am persuaded it will be unnecessary for me
to desire you to do all that men can do to divest yourselves of
that prejudice which you feel against a man in his situation; to
do all that which the Attorney-General has emphatically and
distinctly told you to do-that which the law of this country has
told you to do-that, without which there can be no liberty
existing in this country-that is, to presume him innocent till
guilt is established in evidence; for, until his guilt be made out,
not merely by vague and unconfirmed stories told by suspicious
witnesses, but by that species of evidence which is required by
juries in cases of this sort, it is your bounden duty to presume
him innocent." And, again, at the end of his argument (col.
458, 46o): "This case is not to be made out by conjecture, you
are not to condemn unless all idea of innocence be completely
extinguished by the weight of the evidence that has been pro-
duced upon the cause. * * * Remember the maxim of the
Attorney-General, that 'in proportion as the crime is enormous
so ought the proof to be clear.' "
At the trial of William Palmer for poisoning in 1856, the
2 28 St. Tr. 345, 363 (1803).
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counsel have nothing to say of the presumption of innocence.
And this is what Lord Campbell says in his charge:' "Gentle-
men, I must begin by conjuring you to banish from your minds
all that you may have heard before the prisoner was placed in
that dock. * * * I must not only warn you against being
influenced by what you have before heard, but I must also warn
you not to be influenced by anything but by the evidence which
has been laid before you with respect to the particular charge
for which the prisoner is now arraigned. * * * By the prac-
tice in foreign countries it is allowed to raise a probability of
the prisoner having committed the crime with which he is
charged by proving that he has committed other offences-by
showing that he is an immoral man, and that he is not unlikely
therefore, to have committed the offence with which he is
charged. That is not the case in this country. You must pre-
sume that a man is innocent until his guilt is established, and
his guilt can only be established by evidence directly criminating
him on the charge for which he is tried. * * * Unless by
the evidence for the prosecution a clear conviction has been
brought to your minds of the guilt of the prisoner, it is your
duty to acquit him. You are not to convict him on suspicion,
even on strong suspicion. There must be a strong conviction
in your minds that he is guilty of this offence, and if you have
any reasonable doubt you will give him the benefit of that doubt."
That is the simple, intelligible, plain way in which the pre-
sumption of innocence is dealt with in important cases in Eng-
land. The prisoner is, indeed carefully protected, but his bul-
wark is not found in any emphatic or strained application of the
phrase or the fact of a presumption of innocence.
A Scotch case in 181724 should now be mentioned. We
shall see hereafter the use made of it in Coffin v. U. S. One
Andrew McKinley was indicted for administering false oaths.
There was a question as to the true interpretation of the oaths,
and the counsel for the accused insisted upon his right to have a
favorable construction put on them. He said (col. 283): "In
all criminal cases everything must be strictly interpreted in
favor of the accused and against the prosecutor," and other
similar things. The Advocate Depute, replied (col. 334): "A
great deal was said about the presumption in favor of the inno-
cence of the panel. This is a common topic of declamation,2
23 Palmer's Trial, 166.
24 McKinley's Case, 33 St. Tr. 275.
2s The reader will observe that this is said of Scotland and not of England.
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but I never could understand the presumption of the innocence
of a panel. The onus probandi lies on the prosecutor, and he
must make out his case, but I see no occasion for a presumption
of any sort, but what arises from a want of contrary proof.
And I know no such doctrine in any work on the criminal law
of Scotland." The defence (col. 438-439) declared that "this
was the very first time in a criminal case," that the existence of
a presumption of innocence had been denied, and referred to the
"very obvious and common-place rule of law that in all trials
for crimes there is a presumption in favor of innocence which
runs through the whole proceedings and is applied to the indict-
ment, to the proof, to the verdict." In7 deciding the question then
under discussion in favor of the prosecution, Lord Pitmilly said
(col. 518) that if anything were doubtful about the construction
of the oaths "the presumption must be in favor of innocence.
* * * We are not to presume guilt because the prosecutor
alleges guilt * * * and until guilt is established, we must hold
the presumption to be in favor of innocence." Lord Justice
Clerk said (col. 538), that if the oath were doubtful he was bound
"to let the doubt lean in favor of the accused." None of the
other judges commented on this subject except the single dissent-
ing judge, Lord Gillies. He said (col. 506) in an emphatic
passage that, to be sure, he himself suspected that the oath
was as bad as it was contended, "But," he went on, "the
presumption in favor of innocence is not to be redargued by
mere suspicion. * * * The public prosecutor treats this too
lightly. He seems to think that the law entertains no such pre-
sumption of innocence. I cannot listen to this. I conceive that
this presumption is to be found in every code of law which has
reason and religion and humanity for a foundation. It is a
maxim which ought to be inscribed in indelible characters in the
heart of every judge and juryman, and I was happy to hear
from Lord Hermand that he is inclined to give full effect to it.2
-
To overturn this there should be legal evidence of guilt, carry-
ing home a degree of conviction short only of certainty."
It will be noticed, as I said, that this is a Scotch case, and
Lord Gillies a dissenting judge. The Scotch law is not the
common law, and in Scotch courts the Continental refinements
about presumptions are far more familiar than in England.
The handling of the matter in this case is indeed very simple,
a6 All that Lord Hermand is reported as saying on this matter is (col. 499)
that "Where there is a possibility of a favorable construction for the panel.
it ever will receive effect from me."
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and not at all strained, but the case is not an authority in En-
glish law, or at all indicative of any emphasis, even in the
Scottish courts, in recognizing the presumption of innocence.
The English conception of the presumption of innocence has
been expressed by a writer peculiarly learned in the criminal
law, who had devoted much time to the study and exposition of
it, and, as a judge, was long engaged in administering it. Fitz-
james Stephen, in the second edition of his "General View of
the Criminal Law of England," published in 189o, when the
author had been eleven years a judge of the Queen's Bench
Division, says (p. 183): "I may mention the general pre-
sumption of innocence which, though by no means confined to the
criminal law, pervades the whole of its administration. * * *
[Here he quotes from his "Digest of Evidence" the Article
which is given below.] This is otherwise stated by saying that
the prisoner is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable doubt.
The word 'reasonable' is indefinite, but a rule is not worthless
because it is vague. Its real meaning, and I think its practical
operation, is that it is an emphatic caution against haste in com-
ing to a conclusion adverse to a prisoner. It may be stated
otherwise, but not, I think, more definitely, by saying that be-
fore a man is convicted of a crime every supposition not in itself
improbable, which is consistent with his innocence ought to be
negatived." In his "Digest of Evidence," Article 94, under the
title "Presumption of Innocence," he presents as its definition,
this: "If the commission of a crime is directly in issue in any
proceeding criminal or civil, it must be proved beyond reasonable
doubt. The burden of proving that any person has been guilty
of a crime or wrongful act is on the person who asserts it. "'
This mode of stating or indicating the substance of the pre-
sumption of innocence as applied in criminal proceedings, is
more or less found in our own decisions. Obviously, it is in a
very compact form; and it seems plain that such a statement
adds something to the mere presumption of innocence, for that,
pure and simple, says nothing as to the quantity of evidence or
strength of persuasion needed to convict. But as it is stated
above, the rule includes two things: First, the presumption;
and second, a supplementary proposition as to the weight of evi-
27This article has a second paragraph which runs thus: IThe burden of
proving that any person has been guilty of a crime or wrongful act is on the
person who asserts it, whether the commission of such act is or is not directly
in issue in the action." The doctrine here expressed is probably not the law
in most parts of this country.
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dence which is required to overcome it; the whole doctrine
when drawn out being, first, that a person who is charged with
crime must beproved guilty; that, according to the ordinary rule
of procedure and of legal reasoning, preumiitur pro reo, i. e.,
neganti, so that the accused stands innocent until he is proved
guilty; and, second, that this proof of guilt must displace all
reasonable doubt.
As regards the simple, just, unambiguous rule, which, in
requiring proof, thus emphasizes the weight of evidence and
the strength of persuasion necessary to make it out in a criminal
case, this rule, thus appearing to Stephen to embody and to be
identified with the presumption of innocence as applied to crimi-
nal cases, is a very ancient one. We read in the Corpus Juris, as
far back as the fourth century, a direction which is attributed to
several Emperors in succession: "Let all accusers understand
that in bringing up a matter for judgment it must be supported
by fit witnesses, vel apertissinis documentis vel indiciis ad probationem
indubitatis et lucZ clarioribus "' This passage was cited for the
accused in a Scotch criminal case of piracy in 1705,"9 and scraps
of it lingered long in our own books; as when Coke in his
Third Institute, 76, in speaking of treasons, says: " There
should be a substantial proof in a cause so criminal where pro-
bationes oportent esse lute clariores"; and again, of treason and
felony,"0 that the reason for not allowing counsel to the accused
is that, "the testimonies and proofs of offence ought to be so
clear and manifest as there can be no defence of it." and still
again, he speaks of the rule of law quod in criminalibusprobationes
debent esse lute dariores.""
This rule in England was the one constantly pressed; while,
as I have said, little or no mention was made in terms of a
presumption of innocence. This was the chief rule urged in
behalf of accused persons by the great advocates in the last
century and later, in such cases as those of Lord George Gor-
don, Hardy, Home Tooke and others. MacNally, in his
"Treatise on Evidence in Criminal Cases," at the beginning of
this cpntury, saying little of a presumption of innocence, remarks:
"It may also at this day be considered as arule of law that if the
jury entertain a reasonable doubt they should deliver the
prisoner."
2s Cod. IV. 19, 25.
29 Captain Greens Case, 14 St. Tr. 1199, 1245.
20 lb. 29, 137.
31 b 210.
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There is no need to trace it further, for no one doubts that
in one form or another this has always continued to be a
great and recognized rule. It has, in our inherited system, a
peculiarly important function, that of warning our untrained
tribunal, the jury, against being misled by suspicion, conjec-
ture and mere appearances. In saying that the accused person
shall be proved guilty, it says also that he shall not be presumed
guilty; that he shall be convicted only upon legal evidence, not
tried upon prejudice; that he shall not be made the victim of
the circumstances of suspicion which surround him, the effect of
which it is always so difficult to shake off, circumstances which,
if there were no emphatic rule of law upon the subject would be
sure to operate heavily against him; the circumstances, e. g., that
after an investigation by the grand jury he has been indicted,
imprisoned, seated in the prisoner's dock, carried away hand-
cuffed, isolated, watched, made an object of distrust to all that
behold him. He shall be convicted, this rule says, not upon
any mere presumption, any taking matters for granted on the
strength of these circumstances of suspicion; but he shall be
proved guilty by legal evidence, and by legal evidence which is
peculiarly clear and strong-clear beyond a reasonable doubt.
The whole matter is summed up and neatly put by Chief-Justice
Shaw in Webster's case:2 "The burden of proof is upon the
prosecutor. All the presumptions of law independent of evi-
dence are in favor of innocence, and every person is presumed
to be innocent until he is proved guilty. If upon such proof
there is reasonable doubt remaining, the accused is entitled to the
benefit of it by an acquittal." We observe, then, in this form of
statement that the general rule of policy and sense, that all per-
sons shall be assumed, in the absence of evidence, to be free from
blame, appears in the criminal law, on grounds of fairness and
abundant caution, in an emphatic form, as the presumption of
innocence, and it is there coupled with a separate special rule as
to the weight of evidence necessary to make out guilt.
As to the real nature of the rule about a presumption of inno-
cence, an important intimation is contained in Chief-Justice
Shaw's phrase that, "All the presumptions of law independent of
evidence are in favor of innocence." That appears to be accurate
and exact. The presumption is "independent of evidence,"
being the same in all cases, and in all operating indiscriminately,
in the same way, and with equal force. On what is it founded?
On the fact that men in general do not commit crime? On
325 Cush. 295, 320.
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what is the presumption of sanity founded? On the fact that
men in general are sane? Perhaps so, as a legislative reason, so
to speak, or one of the reasons. But the rule itself is a different
thing from the grounds of it, and when we speak of the pre-
sumption of innocence or of sanity we are talking of a legal rule
of presumption, a legal position, and not of the facts which
are the basis of it.
It is important to observe this, because, by a loose habit of
speech, the presumption is occasionally said to be, itself, evi-
dence, and juries are told to put it in the scale and weigh it.
Greenleaf, in a single phrase, in the first volume of his treatise
on Evidence, section thirty-four, a phrase copied occasionally
into cases and text-books, has said: "This legal presumption of
innocence is to be regarded by the jury in every case as matter
of evidence, to the benefit of which the party is entitled."'"
This statement is condemned by the editor of the last edition of
Greenleaf's book; and in Taylor on Evidence, the great -Eng-
lish handbook, which followed Greenleaf's text closely, this
passage is omitted, and always has been omitted. In the latter
part of Greenleaf's Evidence, Volume III., which deals spe-
cifically with criminal cases, it does not appear. It is denied
also by Chamberlayne, the careful editor of the works on Evi-
dence of Best and Taylor.
What can such a statement as this mean-that the presump-
tion is to be regarded as evidence? Is it meant that on grounds
of natural presumption or inference, innocence is ordinarily
found in criminal cases? As to that, if one would see the true
operation of natural inference, and natural presumption in crimi-
33Compare the remarks of Clifford, J., in Lilienthal's Tobacco v. U. S.,
97 U. S., 237, 267, where an opinion marked by very loose thinking is para-
phrasing some unsupported expressions of Wharton on Evidence. It is easy
to be misled by the figure of speech about turning the scale. When Greenleaf
(Ev. iii. s. 29), in commenting on the difference between criminal and civil
cases as to the quantity of evidence required, after saying that in the latter it
is enough if the evidence preponderates, adds that " in criminal trials, the
party accused is entitled to the benefit of the legal presumption in favor of
innocence, which in doubtful cases is always sufficient to turn the scale in his
favor;" and that it is a rule of criminal law that the guilt of the accused
must be fully proved, and then goes on to give the rule about reasonable
doubt -it seems fairly clear that he is not thinking of the presumption of
innocence itself, as placed in the scale, but rather of the rule requiring
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, as being placed there; and, of course.
that is not so much putting evidence into one scale as saying what evidence
shall be put into the other. It is this rule that "turns the scale," and in
this way.
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nal cases, and would appreciate how entirely artificial, how
purely a matter of policy the whole rule is which bids a jury on
the trial to assume innocence, let him turn his attention to the
action of courts at other stages than the trial. In State v. Mills,
2 Dev. 421 (1830). as illustrating another point then under dis-
cussion, the court (Ruffin, J.) said: "After bill found, a de-
fendant is presumed to be guilty to most, if not to all purposes,
except that of a fair and impartial trial before a petit jury.
This presumption is so strong, that, in the case of a capital
felony the party cannot be let to bail." In Exparte Ryan, 44
Cal. 555 (1872), a party indicted for attempting to murder a
policeman had been held, in the lower court on $15,ooo bail.
On an application to reduce the bail the court (Wallace, C. J.),
refused, saying: "I am bound to assume guilt for the purposes of
this proceeding, for certainly I have no means of determining his
innocence, to say nothing of the principle of law that, except
for the purposes of a fair and impartial trial before a petit jury,
the presumption of guilt arises against the prisoner on finding
the indictment." In the case of In the matter of Henry Alex-
ander, 59 Mo. 598 (1875), the question was, in a capital case,
after repeated trials and disagreements of the jury, whether bail
should be allowed. The Constitution of Missouri, it was held,
allowed bail, except "when the proof was evident or the pre-
sumption great." In allowing it in this case the court (Wag-
ner, J.), said: "The indictment furnishes a strong presumption
of guilt. * * * Hence, in all such cases, there must be facts
and circumstances which counteract or overcome this presump-
tion, before bail will ever be admissible." The same doctrine
was held in State v. Madison County Court (Mo., Dec., 1896), 37
S. W. Rep. 1126, in which the court (Burgess, J.) quotes with
approval the language of the Supreme Court of California in
People v.Tinker, 19 Cal. 539, that "It [the indictment] creates a
presumption of guilt for all purposes except the trial before the
petit jury." These cases are the true ones to illustrate the
operation of natural presumption and natural inference. Yet, at
the trial all such natural probabilities are held off; the board is
swept clear of these, and the accused, while kept well guarded, a
prisoner, is yet to be treated as if no incriminating fact existed.
His record, by a dead lift of legal policy, is now presented as
clean and white. Whatever of wrong or guilt is to be inscribed on
it must be the result of legal evidence now presented to the jury.
The effect of the presumption of innocence, so far from being
that of furnishing to the jury evidence-i. e., probative matter,
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the basis of an inference-is rather the contrary. It takes
possession of this fact, innocence, as not now needing evidence,
as already established prima fade, and says: "Take that for
granted. Let him who denies it, go forward with his evidence."
In criminal cases if the jury were not thus called off from the
field of natural inference, if they were allowed to range there
wherever mere reason and human experience would carry
them, the whole purpose of the presumption of innocence would
be balked. For of the men who are actually brought up for
trial, probably the large majority are guilty. In inquiring
lately of a prosecuting officer for the statistics about this, he re-
plied that out of every one hundred persons indicted for crime
in his jurisdiction, twenty were tried and acquitted, twenty
pleaded guilty, and sixty were tried and convicted. Now the
presumption of innocence forbids the consideration of such pro-
babilities as are here suggested and says simply this: "It is the
right of this man to be convicted upon legal evidence applicable
specifically to him. Start then with the assumption that he is
innocent, and adhere to it till he is proved guilty. He is indeed
under grave suspicion, and it is your duty to test and fairly to
weigh all the evidence against him as well as for him. But he
is not to suffer in your minds from these suspicions or this
necessity of holding him confined and trying him; he is to be
affected by nothing but such evidence as the law allows you to
act upon. For the purposes of this trial you must take him to
be an innocent man, unless and until the government establishes
his guilt."
It may be asked, if then a presumption be not evidence, how
can you know when it is overcome? That depends on the
nature of the case. It is the office of a presumption, as such, to
fix the duty of going on with argument or evidence, on a given
question; and is only that. As to how much evidence is to be
produced, that is another matter. In criminal cases the
rule is fixed that the evidence must negative all reasonable
doubt; nothing else will make a case which the defendant
need meet. Sometimes the presumption calls only for evidence
enough to put the question really into the case, to make it
really a question; sometimes for a f ull prima fade case. But in no
case is there a weighing, a comparison of probative quality, as
between evidence on one side and a presumption on the other."
3 See an article on Presumptions and the Law of Evidence, 3 Harv. Law
Review, 141, z65. The author may be allowed, perhaps, to say that a revis-
ion of this article will appear later in the year, in the concluding part of his
-Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law" (Little, Brown & Co.)
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While then it is true that a presumption may count as evi-
dence, and be a substitute for evidence, in the sense that it will
make a primafacie case for him in whose favor it operates, and
while it is true that the facts on which a presumption is
grounded may count as evidence, the presumption itself; i. e.,
the legal rule, conclusion, or position cannot be evidence,
This question was neatly and accurately dealt with by the
court in Lisbon v. Lyman, 49 N. H. 553 (I§7o). On an issue
as to the emancipation of a minor, the jury were instructed
"that there was a presumption that children under twenty-one
are not emancipated; that the presumption was not conclusive,
and the fact might be shown by proof to be otherwise; but
that in deciding what the fact was, the jury would take this
presumption into account, as one element of evidence, and weigh
it in connection with all the testimony." Doe, J., for the court,
said: "The burden was on the plaintiff to prove that when the
town was divided, the last dwelling place of Volney was in the
defendant's territory. The plaintiff claimed, that Volney,
though a minor, had, by emancipation, acquired a right to have
a home of his own, free from the control of his father. The
emancipation of Volney was set up as an affirmative and essen-
tial part of the plaintiff's case; and in that view it was neces-
sary for the plaintiff to prove it. Without any evidence, or
with evidence equally balanced, on that point, emancipation
would not be proved. The burden of proof was on the plaintiff,
and this burden was not sustained unless the plaintiff proved it
by a preponderance of all the evidence introduced on the subject.
But it was not necessary for the plaintiff to produce anything
more than the slightest preponderance; or to produce a prepon-
derance of anything but evidence. * * * A legal presump-
tion is a rule of law-a reasonable principle, or an arbitrary
dogma-declared by the court. There may be a difficulty in
weighing such a rule of law as evidence of a fact, or in weigh-
ing law on one side against fact on the other. And if the
weight of a rule of law as evidence of a fact, or as counterbal-
ancing the evidence of a fact, can be comprehended, there are
objections to such a use of it. * * * A legal presumption is
not evidence. * * * The presumption against the freedom
of minors was not an element of evidence; could not be
weighed as evidence, and it does not appear that any use could
rightfully be made of it in the case. It was put into the scale
with the defendant's evidence, where it would be likely to mis-
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lead the jury, and give the defendant a material advantage to
which he was not entitled. '
Upon the whole, then, it seems to be true that the pre-
sumption of innocence, as applied in criminal cases, is a form
of expression which requires to be supplemented by the rule
as to the weight of evidence; that it is merely one form of
5 For a different, and, as I must think, a mistaken exposition of the sub-
ject, see Barber's Appeal, 63 Conn. 393, 403, 4o6 (1893). In a probate appeal
involving the question of testamentary capacity, after a verdict against the
will, it appeared that the charge of the judge below was objected to by the
proponents as "confusing and contradictory." Among other things the judge
had said to the jury: "If when the whole matter is before you on the evi-
dence given on both sides, it is left uncertain whether or not the testator was
of sound mind, then * * * the will should not be sustained. In the course
of the trial the balance of evidence may fluctuate from one side to the other,
but the burden of proof remains where it was at the outset, upon the advocates
of the will, and, unless at the close of the trial the balance is with the advo-
cates of the will, unless the beam of the scale tips down on the side of the
advocates of the will, they must fail." The Supreme Court (Fenn, J.) reversed
the judgment below, and in the course of a difficult and unsatisfactory exposi-
tion of the meaning and application of the term "burden of proof," the
opinion says; "The law presumes every person to be so [of sound mind] until
the contrary is shown, and this presumption is of probative force in favor
of the proponents of the wilL * * - In short * * * on the whole case
the question would "be whether the evidence of the contestants sufficiently
preponderated over the rebutting and special evidence of the proponents,
including the evidence of the attesting witnesses, to overcome'the presumption
of sanity which constituted the proponent's firivia facie case. In other words,
leaving the presumption of sanity out of the case, was there more evidence
of insanity than of sanity? So that, putting it again into the case there would
still be as much. Then and then only would the scales of justice, to which
the court below in the case before us referred, be so adjusted, according to
law, that it would be correct to say ' unless at the close of the trial the balance
is with the advocates of the will they must fail; it is not sufficient that the
scales stand evenly balanced."' The opinion does not give its reasons for the
statement that the presumption has a probative quality, and can be "weighed
in the scale," and the case does not necessarily involve the point above dis-
cussed; so that it is quite possible that the above exposition does not carry
with it the authority of all the judges of the comgt. For the true basis and opera-
tion of this presumption see Davis v. U.S., X6o U. S. 469,486 (1895): "If that
presumption [of sanity] were not indulged the government would always be
under the necessity of adducing affirmative evidence of the sanity of an accused.
But a rquirement of that character would seriously delay and embarrass the
enforcement of the laws against crime, and in most cases be unnecessary.
Consequently the law presumes that everyone charged with crime is sane,
and thus supplies in the first instance the required proof of capacity to commit
crime. It authorizes the jury to assume at the outset that the accused is crim-
inally responsible for his acts." Harlan, J., for the Court.
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phrase for what is included in the statement that an accused
person is not to be prejudiced at his trial by having been
charged with crime and held in custody, or by any mere suspicions,
however grave; but is only to be held guilty when the govern-
ment has established his guilt by legal evidence and beyond all
reasonable doubt; that the presumption of innocence is often used
as synonymous with this whole twofold rule, thus drawn out;
that it is a convenient and familiar phrase, and probably a useful
one, when carefully explained; but that it has not played any
conspicuous part in the development of our criminal law except
as expressed in the fuller statement given above. It may be added
that the phrase presumption of innocence if used to a jury, pecu-
liarly needs to be carefully explained, because of the very great
ambiguity connected with the terms "presumption," "burden of
proof" and "evidence," and the way in which these abused ex-
pressions reflect their own ambiguities upon each other.
Let me return now to the case of Coffin v. U. S." It will be
necessary to consider it in some detail. It came up from the Cir-
cuit Court of the United States for Indiana, and was a proceeding
against officials of a National Bank who were convicted below of
wilfully misapplying funds of the bank, and of other related
offenses. A great number of exceptions were taken to the charge
given by the court to the jury. All but two of these were over-
ruled. The principal exception was against the refusal of the
judge to charge as he was requested on the subject of the pre-
sumption of innocence. 7 He had been asked to charge that,
"the law presumes that persons charged with crime are innocent
until they are proved by competent evidence to be guilty. To
the benefit of this presumption the defendants are all entitled,
and this presumption stands as their sufficient protection unless
it has been removed by evidence proving their guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt." The judge refused to give this charge, but
instructed the jury that they could not find the defendants
guilty unless satisfied of their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,
and he said: "If you can reconcile the evidence with any rea-
sonable hypothesis consistent with the defendant's innocence, it
is your duty to do so. In that case find defendant not guilty.
And if, after weighing all the proofs, and looking only to the
36 156 U. S. 432.
37 The action of the trial Judge is described in the opinion of the upper
court thus: "Whilst the court refused to instruct as to the presumption of
innocence, it instructed fully as to reasonable doubt." This statement is not
quite exact, as will be indicated later.
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proofs, you impartially and honestly entertain the belief that
the defendant may be innocent of the offences charged against
him, he is entitled to the benefit of that doubt, and you should
acquit him." In various forms the judge went on to explain
what "a reasonable doubt" is, and to make very clear the duty
of the jury as to the weight of evidence which they were bound
to require before they could find guilt.
The Supreme Court held that there was error in refusing the
charge which was desired on the presumption of innocence;
and, while recognizing that no particular form of words was
necessary, in dealing with this presumption, they held that the
error was not made good by anything found in the rest of the
charge. The opinion of the court was given by Mr. Justice
White, and was not accompanied by any expression of dissent.
It declares that the principle that there is a presumption of inno-
cence is "axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at
the foundation of the administration of our criminal law."
Many citations are given to show that there is a presumption of
innocence. Th e doctrine that guilt can only be found by the
clearest evidence is quoted from various writers, and this prin-
ciple is referred to as being, in the language of the court, one of
the "results of this maxim" of the presumption of innocence,
but no reason is given for this view other than what will be
stated hereafter. The language of Lord Gillies, the dissenting
judge in the Scotch case already referred to, McKinley's case, is
cited at length, as showing, in the phrase of the opinion, "how
fully the presumption of innocence had been evolved as a prin-
ciple and applied at common law"; but it is not remarked that
this is a dissenting opinion, and that the case is a Scotch case,
and not one at common law. The opinion then goes on to
inquire whether the charge did substantially embody a state-
ment of the presumption of innocence. It is declared that the
authorities upon what is a sufficient statement of this presump-
tion are "few and unsatisfactory." Referring to cases in Texas,
Indiana, Ohio. Alabama and California, on one side and the
other of the question, to an anonymous article in the Criminal
Law Magazine, and to Stephen's statement of the presumption of
inneence, and the remarks of Mr. Chamberlayne, the editor of
Best, the opinion goes on to say that it is necessary to consider
"the distinction between the presumption of innocence and rea-
sonable doubt, as if it were an original question." The ques-
tion is then put as being "whether the two are equivalents of
each other?" and it is proposed to "ascertain with accuracy in
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what each consists." It may be remarked, at this point, that
this form of putting the question, imputes a very fatuous confu-
sion of ideas to those who hold that the rule requiring proof of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt embodies in it all that the pre-
sumption of innocence really means. They would hardly agree
that they are arguing that the presumption of innocence and
reasonable doubt are "equivalents of each other"; or that the ex-
ploit of the opinion as it is described in a later case" in saying,
"The court drew a distinction between the presumption of inno-
cence as one of the instruments of proof, contributing to bring
about that state of case from which reasonable doubt arises, and
a condition of mind called reasonable doubt produced by the evi-
dence, "-that this feat was either one that required much pains
to accomplish or one that particularly concerned their own con-
tention.
Having thus started on this interesting and important in-
quiry the opinion proceeds: "The presumption of innocence is
a conclusion drawn by the law in favor of the citizen, by virtue
whereof when brought to trial on a criminal charge he must be
acquitted unless he is proven to be guilty. In other words, this
presumption is an instrument of proof created by the law in
favor of one accused whereby his innocence is established until
sufficient evidence is introduced to overcome the proof which
the law has created. This presumption, on the one hand, sup-
plemented by any other evidence he may adduce, and the evi-
dence against him on the other, constitute the elements from
which the legal conclusion of his guilt or innocence is to be
drawn." The court then quotes the passage from Greenleaf
on Evidence,'9 upon which I have commented; a passage from
Wills on Circumstantial Evidence, stating that there is such
a presumption and that it prevails "until destroyed by such an
overpowering amount of legal evidence of guilt as is calculated
to produce the opposite belief"; another from Best on Pre-
sumptions, simply saying that it is presuvlpio juris; another from
an anonymous article in the Criminal Law Magazine,
0 stating
that the presumption is "in the nature of evidence in his favor,
and a knowledge of it should be communicated to the jury,"
etc. The opinion then goes on, "The fact that the presumption
of innocence is recognized as a presumption of law, and is char-
s Cochran v. U. S., 157 U. S.. 286, 299.
9Grlf. Ev. I. s. 34.
40 Which appears to have been an advance chapter of Thompson on Trials.
The passage is found in that work, s. 246r.
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acterized by the civilians as bresumpdo juris, demonstrates that it
is evidence in favor of the accused; for in all systems of law
legal presumptions are treated as evidence giving rise to result-
ing proof to the full extent of their legal efficacy. Concluding
then that the presumption of innocence is evidence in favor of
the accused, introduced by the law in his behalf, let us consider
what is reasonable doubt." We are then told that reasonable
doubt is "the condition of mind produced by the proof resulting
from the evidence in the cause. It is the result of proof, not the
proof itself; whereas the presumption of innocence is one of the
instruments of proof going to bring about the proof from which
reasonable doubt arises; thus one is a cause, the other an effect.
To say that the one is the equivalent of the other is therefore to say
that legal evidence can be excluded from the jury, and that such
exclusion may be cured by instructing them correctly in regard
to the method by which they are required to reach their con-
clusion upon the proof actually before them. In other words,
that the exclusion of an important element of proof can be jus-
tified by correctly instructing as to the proof admitted."
Farther on, the opinion says: "It is clear that the failure to
instruct them [the jury] in regard to what that is [the presump-
tion of innocence], excluded from their minds a portion of the
proof created by the law, and which they were bound to con-
sider." And it is added that the judge below in limiting the
attention of the jury " 'to the proofs and the proofs only' con-
fined them to those matters which were admitted to their con-
sideration by the court, and among these elements of proof the
court expressly refused to include the presumption of innocence
to which the accused was entitled, and which the court was
bound to extend him."
The following remarks are also thrown in near the end of
the discussion: "The evolution of the principle of the presump-
tion of innocence, and its resultant, the, doctrine of reasonable
doubt, makes more apparent the correctness of these views, and
indicates the necessity of enforcing the one in order that the
other may continue to exist. While Rome and the Medieval-
ists taught that wherever doubt existed in a criminal case
acquittal must follow, the expounders of the common law in
their devotion to human liberty and individual rights traced this
doctrine of doubt to its true origin, the presumption of inno-
cence, and rested it upon this enduring basis." It would
be instructive to know the ground for this statement as
to "the expounders of the common law," and the establishing
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of this "enduring basis." Unless the phrase refers to an
occasional loose dictum of a law writer or judge in this country,
or to an occasional ill-considered judicial opinion here, I know
of no ground for these remarks.
Such was the decision, in Coffin v. U. S., so far as relates to
the point now under consideration, and such was the general
course of the exposition. It proceeds, in a word, on the ground
that the lower court refused to recognize the presumption of
innocence, and thus kept from the jury a piece of evidence in
behalf of the accused to which he was entitled. The immediate
result of the decision was that it helped to delay the punish-
ment of persons well deserving it, as appeared when the case
came back again after another trial, and all of "very numerous
grounds of error" urged by these defendants were overruled.,'
It is interesting to observe that, at the new trial, the charge, so
far as quoted, dealt with'the matters now under c6nsideration in
this form (p. 68i): "The -burden of proving Haughey and the
defendants guilty as charged rests upon the government, and the
burden does not shift from it. Haughey and the defendants are
presumed to be innocent until their guilt in manner and fQrm
* * * is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. To justify you
in returning a verdict of guilty, the evidence should be of
such a character as to overcome this presumption of innocence
and to satisfy each one of you of the guilt of Haughey and the de-
fendants as charged, to the exclusion of every reasonable doubt."
This instruction seems to have raised no question. Except
as leaving to the jury without explanation two phrases full of
ambiguity, namely, "presumption of innocence" and "evidence
* * * to overcome" it, it seems not to differ materially from
the former charge. Can it reasonably be supposed that on such
a charge anybody would imagine the presumption to be a piece
of evidence, to be placed in the scales and weighed against other
evidence? Such a charge is only in form an acceptance of the
exposition in the former opinion of the Supreme Court; it is
mere lip service.'
That opinion, however, has had an effect outside of the par-
ticular case. Its somewhat wider range than common of refer-
ence and allusion, has caused the imputing to it of an amount of
learning and careful research to which, when scrutinized, it can
lay no claim; and, to be quite just, it does not, in fact, lay claim
to it. But it does lay claim to exactness of discrimination, to a
41 Coffin v. U. S., 162 U. S. 664 (May, r896).
42See also Agnew v. U. S., 17 S. C. P- 234, 241 (January, 1897).
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searching and fundamental examination of the nature of the
questions involved, and to the character of a leading and, in a
degree, a final discussion of a peculiarly vexed and difficult sub-
ject. This claim must be disputed. What has been said in the
earlier pages of this paper will serve to show grounds for deny-
ing the truth of the chief historical suggestions of the opinion,
and the validity of some of its fundamental conceptions. In-
stead of settling anything outside of the particular controversy,
it leaves matters worse off than before. Its work of mischief
may be seen in the use of it in such later cases as Cochran v. U.
S.,43 U. S. v. Davis'" Agnew v. U. S."' (I do not now speak
of the actual point decided in either of these cases), and No.
Ca. v. Gosnell." The difficulty with the case is not with the
actual decision-namely, that on the point in question a new trial
was granted; that could easily be agreed to, without any serious
difference as to the principal matters. The trouble is with the
exposition and the reasons. The absence, therefore, of dissent
in this case may have very little significance."
It may readily be admitted, as the event shows, that it would
have been practically wiser on the part of the judge below to
have given the charge as requested and to have accompanied it
43 157 U. S. 286 (March 25, i895).
4I6o U. S. 469.
4'17 S. C. R. 234.
46 74 Fed. Rep. 734 (W. D. No. Ca., June, i896).
41 That the exposition and the reasoning in Coffin v. U. S., 156 U. S. 432,
count for little in the mind of the court, may be seen in Allen v. U. S., 164
U. S. 492, Soo (Dec. 1896). Error was assigned in a refusal to charge that
"where there is a probability of innocence, there is a reasonable doubt of
guilt." In overruling the exception, the court (Brown, J.) after remarking
that in the Coffin case a refusal to charge on the presumption of innocence was
held not to be met by a charge that a conviction could not be had unless guilt
were shown beyond a reasonable doubt, added: "In the case under considera-
tion, however, the court had already charged the jury that they could not find
the defendant guilty unless they were satisfied from the testimony that the
crime was established beyond a reasonable doubt; that this meant: ' First,
that a party starts into a trial, though accused by the grand jury with the
crime of murder, or any other crime, with the presumption of innocence in his
favor. That stays with him until it is driven out of the case by the testimony.
It is driven out of the case when the evidence shows beyond a reasonable
doubt that the crime as charged has been committed, or that a crime has been
committed. Whenever the proof shows beyond a reasonable doubt the exis-
tence of a crime, then the presumption of innocence disappears from the case.
That exists up to the time that it is driven out in that way by proof to that
extent.' The court having thus charged upon the subject of the presumption
of innocence could not be required to repeat the charge in a separate instruc-
tion at the request of the defendant." Compare Agnew v. U. S., Ubi supra.
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with such explanations as would clear away ambiguity and
would prevent the jury from misapplying the statements. And,
farther than that, it may be true, as a general proposition, that
the right should be maintained to have the presumption of inno-
cence, specifically and by name, drawn to the attention of the
jury. If so, it should also be required that it be definitely and
accurately explained, so that it be not misused as if in itself it
constituted a piece of probative matter to be weighed against
other evidence; and again, so that it be not used in a way to pre-
vent the jury from allowing all evidence against the accused to
have its full natural effect, all through the case, as it is put in.
Certainly such a specific declaration and explanation as to the
presumption of innocence would draw pointed attention to those
dangers of injury to the accused from mere suspicion, prejudice
or distrust, and to those other grounds of policy on which it
rests, which make these judicial warnings so important.
Now what, exactly, was it that the judge below said on this
subject? He said something which, although quoted, is not
commented upon, or, as it would seem, duly appreciated by the
court, viz: "If, therefore, you can reconcile the evidence with
any reasonable hypothesis consistent with the defendants' inno-
cence, it is your duty to do so, and in that case find the defend-
ants not guilty. And if, after weighing all the proofs, and look-
ing only to the proofs, you impartially and honestly entertain
the belief that the defendants may be innocent of the offense
charged against them, they are entitled to the benefit of that
doubt, and you should acquit them." This language required
the jury, in considering the evidence, to put upon it the con-
struction most favorable to the defendants' innocence. In effect
it said to the jury. " So long and so far as you reasonably
can, hold them innocent, assume them innocent, or, if you
please, presume them innocent, for these forms of phrase mean
the same thing. Let nothing but legal evidence count against
them, look to the proofs and the proofs only, and let not the
evidence or any amount of evidence count against them, so long
as you can continue as reasonable men to think them innocent."
When the judge below had said that, in addition to further
elaborate and confessedly adequate instructions as to the rule
which requires a weight of evidence beyond reasonable doubt, I
think that it cannot truly be said, as the opinion does say, that
"the court refused to instruct as to the presumption of inno-
cence"; and, again, that "among these elements of proof the
court expressly refused to include the presumption of inno-
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cence." What the judge below did was, in reality, to refuse
to instruct in the particular form requested; and that sort of re-
fusal is not necessarily fatal; for, as the court in the Coffin case
justly says, "It is well settled that there is no error in refusing
to charge precisely as requested, provided the instruction actu-
ally given fairly covers and includes the instruction asked."
The whole question is, then, whether the instruction below
fairly covers the instruction asked. The instruction asked was
this: "The law presumes that persons charged with crimes are
-innocent until they are proven by competent evidence to be
guilty. To the benefit of this presumption the defendants are
all entitled, and this presumption stands as their sufficient pro-
tection, unless it has been removed by evidence proving their
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." I think that this charge
was, in effect, given when the jury were told that they were to
reconcile the evidence with the supposition of the defendant's
innocence if it was reasonably possible; to consider nothing but
the evidence and only to find the defendants guilty when the
evidehce proved it beyond a reasonable doubt.
It will be noticed that the charge requested did not ask for
any explanation of the presumption of innocence, nor did the
charge given make any explanation of it. As the request for a
charge did not say that the presumption of innocence was in
itself evidence, so the charge given did not deny that it was evi-
dence. Why the jury should presume innocence was not stated
in the request for a charge, and in the charge as actually given
it was not stated why the jury should construe the evidence
favorably to the accused so long as it was reasonably possible to
do so. It was not necessary to do it, in either case, for in
both cases it was a rule that was being laid down to the jury,
and the grounds of the rule were not necessarily to be stated.
In so far as evidence, in any proper sense of the word, was con-
cerned, no question was made about it, in the talk about the
presumption. If it be thought true that the fact that men in
general are innocent is the evidential ground for the rule men-
tioned in the request, or in the charge, it was nothing to the
purpose to go into that; for it is merely the legislative reason for
laying down such a rule. In so far as the facts on which the
rule rests were themselves to be regarded as evidence or a basis
for inference in the case, the request draws no attention to
them, and the mere omission to charge on them is no legitimate
ground of exception-according to a familiar rule on that sub-
ject. Moreover, in so far as the fact that men in general are
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innocent is a ground of inference for the jury it is one to be
taken notice of by court, counsel and jury without proof, and
without anybody's moving them thereto. Certainly there was
no refusal of any request to call the attention of the jury to the
fact that men in general are innocent; the refusal was one to
charge on the presumption of innocence in the form above stated,
and that form offered no suggestion whatever as to what the true
import of the phrase is. The accused then had no cause of com-
plaint that any request of his counsel was refused.
But now we come to the kernel of the matter, the exposition
in the opinion of the meaning of that phrase. Let us look at
that. It is said that the presumption of innocence is a conclu-
sion drawn by the law by virtue of which, on a trial, the accused
must be acquitted unless proved guilty. This, it will be
observed, states the presumption as being a legal "conclusion"
requiring exactly what was fully set forth by the trial judge.
Then we are told that the presumption is an instrument of proof
created by law in favor of the accused whereby his innocence is
established until sufficient evidence is introduced to over-
come the proof which the law has created. Here the pre-
sumption becomes an instrument of proof establishing innocence,
and is itself proof, created by the law. This presumption, it is
said again, supplemented by any other evidence the accused
may produce, on the one hand, and the evidence against him on
the other, constitute the elements from which the legal conclu-
sion of guilt or innocence is to be drawn. Here the presump-
tion, our "conclusion drawn by the law," our "instrument of
proof," our "proof created by law," becomes evidence; i. e.,
probative matter, to be added to the evidence of the accused,
and balanced against the evidence of the government. How the
presumption can be weighed and estimated as evidence we are
not told.
After some quotations the opinion then says that the fact
that the presumption of innocence is aPresumnptio juris, demon-
strates that it is evidence in favor of the accused; for, it is
added, in all systems of law, legal presumptions are treated as
evidence giving rise to resulting proof, to the full extent of their
legal efficacy. No authority is given for that statement, and
no explanation of what it means; but it is added, "Concluding
then that the presumption of innocence is evidence in favor of
the accused, introduced by the law in his behalf," etc., etc.;
and then later, it "is one of the instruments of proof, going to
bring about the proof from which reasonable doubt arises."
THE PRESUAfPTION OF INNOCENCE.
Again, the exclusion of it is called excluding "legal evidence,"
excluding "an important element of proof," excluding "a por-
tion of the proof created by law."
To sum it up, the substance of all this is, as I have said be-
fore, that the presumption of innocence is apiece of evidence, apart
of the proof-i. e., a thing to be weighed as having probative
quality. And the grounds for saying it are: (i) The authority
of the phrase in Greenleaf's Evidence, to which I have re-
ferred; (2) A similar phrase in an article in the Criminal Law
Magazine, that it "'is in the nature of evidence"; to which are
added (3) a statement in another text-book (Wills' Circumstan-
tial Evidence) that the presumption must prevail till destroyed
by such an overpowering amount of legal evidence of guilt as is
calculated to produce the opposite belief; and (4) a statement in
Best on Presumptions that it is presumptio juris. This is the
authority, and it is slight indeed. And the opinion adds a
strange, unsupported assertion that the recognition of the pre-
sumption of innocence as a presumption of law (presumptiojuris)
demonstrates it to be evidence, and that in all systems of law
legal presumptions of law are treated as evidence. It is easy to
make such an assertion and to leave the matter there. But as
one who has long and attentively studied the subject of pre-
sumptions, I can only say that I know of nothing to support it in
any sense which tends to sustain the reasoning of the opinion.
What appears to be true may be stated thus:
i. A presumption operates to relieve the party in whose
favor it works from going forward in argument or evidence.
2. .t serves therefore the purposes of aprima facie case, and
in that sense it is, temporarily, the substitute or equivalent for
evidence.
3. It serves this purpose until the adversary has gone for-
ward with his evidence. How much evidence shall be required
from the adversary to meet the presumption, or, as it is vari-
ously expressed, to overcome it or destroy it, is determined by
no fixed rule. It may be merely enough to make it reasonable
to require the other side to answer; it may be enough to make
out a full prima facie case, and it may be a great weight of evi-
dence, excluding all reasonable doubt.
4. A mere presumption involves no rule as to the weight of
evidence necessary to meet it. When a presumption is called a
strong one, like the presumption of legitimacy, it means that it
is accompanied by another rule relating to the weight of evi-
dence to be brought in by him against whom it operates.
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5. A presumption itself contributes no evidence, and has no
probative quality. It is sometimes said that the presumption
will tip the scale when the evidence is balanced. But, in truth,
nothing tips the scale but evidence, and a presumption-
being a legal rule or a legal conclusion-is not evidence. It
may represent and spring from certain evidential facts; and
these facts may be put in the scale. But that is not putting in
the presumption itself. A presumption may be called "an
instrument of proof," in the sense that it determines from whom
the evidence shall come, and it may be called something "in the
nature of evidence," for the same reason; or it may be called
a substitute for %evidence, and even "evidence"-in the sense
that it counts at the outset, for evidence enough to make aprima
face case. But the moment these conceptions give way to the
perfectly distinct notion of evidence proper-i e., probative
matter, which may be a basis of inference, something capable of
being weighed in the scales of reason and compared and esti-
mated with other matter of the probative sort-so that we get to
treating the presumption of innocence or any other presumption,
as being evidence in this its true sense, then we have wandered
into the region of shadows and phantoms.
James Bradley Thayer
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